Court decisions cited on TaxProc

These are the court decisions the guides rely on, grouped by the question they decide. Each entry states the holding the way the citing page does and links to that page, where the decision sits next to the Code section, the regulation and the IRM procedure it affects. The IRS follows some of these decisions and litigates against others; where a circuit split exists, the page says which circuit controls and what that means for the choice of forum.

Deadlines and jurisdiction

CaseBoechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. 199 (2022)

The 30-day period to petition the Tax Court from a CDP determination under IRC 6330(d)(1) is a nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling; whether tolling is warranted is decided on the facts, so the holding rescues the rare case, not routine lateness. IRM 8.22.5.3.2 now applies it. On: CDP hearings, Form 12153 (CDP hearing), Tax Court petition deadline

CaseHallmark Research Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. 126 (2022)

After Boechler, the Tax Court held that the 90-day deficiency petition deadline in IRC 6213(a) remains jurisdictional, so a late petition is dismissed and cannot be equitably tolled. Still the Tax Court's own precedent outside the Second and Third Circuits. On: Notice of deficiency

CaseCulp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196 (3d Cir. 2023)

Because Congress did not clearly state that the IRC 6213(a) deadline is jurisdictional, it is not; it is presumptively subject to equitable tolling. Remanded for the Tax Court to decide whether tolling applied. On: Notice of deficiency

CaseBuller v. Commissioner, No. 24-1557 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2025)

The Second Circuit agreed with Culp: IRC 6213(a) is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling, and reversed the Tax Court's dismissal of a late petition. On: Notice of deficiency

CaseGolsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970)

The Tax Court follows the precedent of the circuit to which an appeal would lie. The IRM tells Appeals officers to apply it when circuit law conflicts with an IRS position (IRM 8.6.4.2.7), which is why a protest should name the controlling circuit. On: Formal protest letter, Hazards of litigation settlements

Notices of deficiency

CaseAbeles v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1019 (1988)

A taxpayer's last known address is the address on the most recently filed and properly processed return unless the IRS has been given clear and concise notification of a different address; when the IRS knows joint filers have separate addresses it must send duplicate originals of the joint notice to each spouse. On: Notice of deficiency

CaseScar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987)

A notice of deficiency that revealed on its face that no determination had been made for the taxpayers (wrong tax shelter, return admittedly unavailable, maximum rate applied) did not satisfy IRC 6212(a) and the Tax Court should have dismissed for want of jurisdiction; a notice that is merely erroneous remains valid. On: Notice of deficiency

Appeals: access and ex parte rules

CaseFacebook, Inc. v. IRS, No. 17-cv-06490-LB (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018)

A taxpayer had no enforceable right to take its docketed case to IRS Appeals; the taxpayer bill of rights in IRC 7803(a)(3) created none and the referral decision was not reviewable under the APA. Congress responded in the Taxpayer First Act with IRC 7803(e)(4) and (5), which make Appeals generally available and require a written explanation and protest procedure when referral is denied, but create no court remedy. On: IRS Independent Office of Appeals

CaseDrake v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 201 (2005)

A memorandum from an IRS insolvency advisor to the settlement officer attacking the credibility of the taxpayer's counsel, not shared with the taxpayer, was a prohibited ex parte communication under Rev. Proc. 2000-43; the court remanded for a new CDP hearing before an independent Appeals officer. On: Ex parte rules

CaseIndustrial Investors v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-93

A revenue officer's cover letter transmitting the file that gave his opinion of the taxpayer and advocated a result was a prohibited ex parte communication; actual influence is not required, only a reasonable possibility that impartiality was compromised, so the harmless error argument failed and the case was remanded to a different Appeals officer. On: Ex parte rules

CaseMoore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-171

Later informing the taxpayer of prohibited ex parte communications does not cure the breach and independent grounds for the determination do not moot it; the case was remanded for Appeals to apply an administrative remedy, though a taxpayer raising only frivolous arguments may get no relief. On: Ex parte rules

Refund claims and suits

CaseUnited States v. Kales, 314 U.S. 186 (1941)

A timely written notice fairly advising the Commissioner of the nature of the taxpayer's claim will be treated as a claim where its formal defects are remedied by a formal claim filed after the limitations period (the informal claim doctrine). On: Refund suits and claims

CaseAngelus Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 293 (1945)

The Commissioner may insist on full compliance with the claim regulations (now Treas. Reg. 301.6402-2(b)(1)), and waiver of their requirements is found only on an unmistakable showing that the Commissioner in fact dispensed with them and examined the merits of the specific claim; a suit cannot vary from the grounds in the claim. On: Refund suits and claims

CaseUnited States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997)

Equitable tolling does not apply to the IRC 6511 time and amount limits on refund claims; Congress then added IRC 6511(h) in 1998, suspending the periods while an individual is financially disabled. On: Refund suits and claims

CaseLewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281 (1932)

In a refund suit the government may redetermine the entire tax liability for the year and retain the payment to the extent it does not exceed the correct tax, even though the statute of limitations bars assessment of any additional amount. On: Refund suits and claims

Summonses and third-party contacts

CaseUnited States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964)

The IRS need not show probable cause to enforce a summons but must show a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to it, that the information is not already in its possession, and that the Code's administrative steps were followed; the burden of showing an abuse of the court's process is on the taxpayer. On: IRS summonses in exams

CaseUnited States v. Clarke, 573 U.S. 248 (2014)

A taxpayer may examine IRS agents about their reasons for issuing a summons only when the taxpayer points to specific facts or circumstances plausibly raising an inference of bad faith; a bare allegation of improper purpose is not enough, though circumstantial evidence can suffice. On: IRS summonses in exams

CaseTiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S. 310 (1985)

A summons served on a known taxpayer with the dual purpose of investigating that taxpayer and unnamed parties need not comply with the John Doe procedure of IRC 7609(f) as long as all the information sought is relevant to a legitimate investigation of the summoned taxpayer. On: IRS summonses in exams

CaseUnited States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984)

No work-product immunity protects an independent auditor's tax accrual workpapers from an IRC 7602 summons, and there is no accountant-client privilege; restrictions on the summons power beyond traditional privileges are for Congress. On: IRS summonses in exams

CasePolselli v. IRS, 598 U.S. 432 (2023)

The IRC 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) exception from notice for a summons issued in aid of collecting an assessment applies whether or not the taxpayer has a legal interest in the summoned records, so third parties get no notice and no quash remedy; the exception is confined to collection summonses, not examination summonses. On: IRS summonses in exams

CaseJ.B. v. United States, 916 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2019)

Summons enforcement refused where the IRS did not follow the third-party contact notice rules of IRC 7602(c); cited in IRM 25.5.10.3 as the reason examiners must document the Letter 3164 notice before contacting third parties. On: IRS summonses in exams, Third-party contacts

Exams: burden of proof and worker status

CaseWelch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933)

The Commissioner's determination has the support of a presumption of correctness and the taxpayer has the burden of proving it wrong; IRC 7491(a) now shifts the burden on a factual issue only where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence and has substantiated, kept records and cooperated with reasonable IRS requests. On: How IRS exams work

CaseWeber v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 378 (1994), aff'd 60 F.3d 1104 (4th Cir. 1995)

Employee status is decided under common-law rules by weighing control over the details of the work, investment in facilities, opportunity for profit or loss, right to discharge, whether the work is part of the principal's regular business, permanency, and the relationship the parties believe they are creating; the right to control is the crucial test. On: Employment tax exams

Assessment statute and fraud

CaseBadaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386 (1984)

A later non-fraudulent amended return does not start the assessment period running on an original fraudulent return; the period stays open under IRC 6501(c)(1). On: Assessment statute (IRC 6501)

CaseAllen v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 37 (2007)

A preparer's intent to evade tax keeps the assessment period open under IRC 6501(c)(1) even though the taxpayer did not know; the statute keys the extension to the fraudulent nature of the return, not the identity of the perpetrator. The position the IRS follows (IRM 25.6.1.9.5.2). On: Assessment statute (IRC 6501)

CaseCity Wide Transit, Inc. v. Commissioner, 709 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2013)

An accountant who filed fraudulent employment tax returns to embezzle the savings intentionally evaded tax, triggering IRC 6501(c)(1) against the company; the Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court. On: Assessment statute (IRC 6501)

CaseBASR Partnership v. United States, 795 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015)

The IRC 6501(c)(1) exception applies only when the taxpayer, not a third party, has the intent to evade; the Federal Circuit found Allen unpersuasive. Binding in refund suits in the Court of Federal Claims, which makes that forum the one where the argument wins. On: Assessment statute (IRC 6501)

CaseMurrin v. Commissioner, No. 24-2037 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2025, amended Oct. 17, 2025)

The Third Circuit sided with the Tax Court: because IRC 6501(c)(1) is agnostic about who must intend to evade, taxpayer intent is not required when the preparer intended to evade. On: Assessment statute (IRC 6501)

CaseHarlan v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 31 (2001)

For the six-year substantial omission rule, a partner who lists the partnership on Schedule E is treated as disclosing the partnership's gross income; cited in IRM 25.6.1.9.5.3. On: Assessment statute (IRC 6501)

CaseBeard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766 (1984), aff'd 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986)

A document is a return that starts the assessment period only if there is sufficient data to calculate tax liability, it purports to be a return, it reflects an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the tax law, and it is executed under penalties of perjury. On: Assessment statute (IRC 6501), Bankruptcy and tax debts

CaseZellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172 (1934)

An honest, sworn original return starts the limitation period even if inaccurate, and a later amended return does not toll a limitation which has once begun to run. On: Assessment statute (IRC 6501), Amended returns during an exam

CaseUnited States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478 (2012)

Following Colony, an overstatement of basis that understates gain is not an omission from gross income under IRC 6501(e)(1)(A); superseded for returns filed after July 31, 2015 (and earlier returns then still open) by IRC 6501(e)(1)(B)(ii), added by Pub. L. 114-41, which treats a basis overstatement as an omission. On: Assessment statute (IRC 6501)

Penalties and reasonable cause

CaseUnited States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985)

Reliance on an agent to file a return on time is not reasonable cause for late filing under IRC 6651(a)(1); meeting a deadline requires no special training or effort. Still the controlling rule for filing and payment deadlines, with reliance on substantive advice carved out. On: Reasonable cause

CaseNeonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43 (2000), aff'd 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002)

The three-part test for reliance on an advisor against the IRC 6662 accuracy penalty: a competent professional with sufficient expertise, necessary and accurate information provided to the advisor, and actual good-faith reliance. On: Reasonable cause

CaseHaynes v. United States, 760 F. App'x 324 (5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished)

A preparer's last-day e-filing was rejected and nobody learned of it for ten months; the Fifth Circuit vacated summary judgment for the government on a disputed fact and expressly declined to decide whether Boyle extends to e-filing. On: Reasonable cause

CaseIntress v. United States, No. 3:18-cv-00851 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 2, 2019)

Boyle applies to e-filed returns: the taxpayer is never obligated to use a preparer, so the duty to meet the deadline remains the taxpayer's. Refund suit dismissed. On: Reasonable cause

CaseWalquist v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. No. 3 (2019)

A substantial understatement penalty determined by an IRS computer program without human review is automatically calculated through electronic means under IRC 6751(b)(2)(B) and exempt from written supervisory approval. Arose from the Automated Correspondence Exam program; the IRM takes the same position for AUR penalties. On: CP2000 (underreporter proposal), Supervisory approval (6751(b))

CaseGraev v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 485 (2017)

For an individual, the IRS's burden of production on a penalty includes proving compliance with the IRC 6751(b) supervisory approval requirement; the IRM cites it in the hazards-of-litigation analysis Appeals performs. On: Hazards of litigation settlements, Supervisory approval (6751(b))

CaseFlora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960)

The full payment rule: a refund suit in district court or the Court of Federal Claims requires that the assessment first be paid in full. The IRM cites it for penalty refund suits; divisible penalties such as the TFRP have their own pay-one-and-sue route. On: Refund claims for paid penalties, Trust fund recovery penalty

Collection due process

CaseMason v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 301 (2009)

A responsible person who never received the Letter 1153 offering an Appeals conference had no prior opportunity to dispute the trust fund recovery penalty and may contest liability in a CDP hearing, with de novo review in the Tax Court. The assessment itself is valid when the letter was properly mailed but not received. On: CDP hearings, Trust fund recovery penalty, Letter 1153: proposed TFRP

CaseRobinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006), reversing 123 T.C. 85

Abuse-of-discretion review of a CDP determination is confined to the administrative record made before Appeals; the Tax Court should not have received new evidence at trial. The Tax Court majority had held otherwise, so the record rule is a circuit-by-circuit question. On: CDP hearings

CaseVinatieri v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 392 (2009)

IRC 6343(a)(1)(D) and its regulation require release of a levy that creates an economic hardship regardless of the taxpayer's unfiled returns; Appeals abused its discretion by sustaining a wage levy after its own notes showed the hardship criteria were met. On: Currently not collectible

CaseGiamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107 (2007)

The Tax Court does not have authority to consider IRC 6330(c)(2) issues (liability challenges, spousal defenses, collection alternatives) that were not raised before the Appeals Office, so an argument first made in the petition cannot be the basis for reversing a CDP determination. On: CDP hearings

CaseMurphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301 (2005), aff'd 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006)

Rejection of an offer in compromise in a CDP hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion; the court does not conduct an independent review of what would be an acceptable offer and asks only whether the rejection was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Ability to pay in full is a regulatory precondition to an effective tax administration offer. On: CDP hearings, Effective tax administration offers, Offer in compromise, Reasonable collection potential

CaseKeller v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2009)

In the Ninth Circuit, review of a CDP determination is confined to the administrative record before Appeals; rejecting offers substantially below the reasonable collection potential computed under the IRM, and computational errors that still leave the offer below ability to pay, are not abuses of discretion. On: CDP hearings, Offer in compromise, Reasonable collection potential

CaseKennedy v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 255 (2001)

A decision letter issued after an equivalent hearing is not a determination under IRC 6320 or 6330, so the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction, and granting an equivalent hearing does not waive the 30-day deadline for requesting a CDP hearing. On: Equivalent hearings

CaseCraig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252 (2002)

Where the CDP request was in fact timely and Appeals mistakenly held an equivalent hearing, the decision letter is a determination under IRC 6330(d)(1) and the Tax Court has jurisdiction; the label is a distinction without a difference. On: Equivalent hearings

Offers and installment agreements

CaseSpeltz v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 165 (2005)

IRC 7122 does not require the IRS to compromise a correctly computed liability (there, AMT on incentive stock options) because the taxpayer considers the statute unfair; the regulation and IRM definitions of special circumstances and public policy are not unreasonable, and refusing the offer was not an abuse of discretion. On: Effective tax administration offers, Offer in compromise

CaseOrum v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 1 (2004), aff'd 412 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2005)

Appeals did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a new installment agreement where the taxpayers had defaulted a prior agreement, were not current on estimated tax, and failed to provide requested financial information by the deadline; a second notice of intent to levy issued after the agreement was terminated did not create a new right to a CDP hearing. On: Installment agreements

CaseThompson v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 173 (2013)

In computing a partial payment installment agreement, Appeals did not abuse its discretion by disallowing church tithing and children's college costs as conditional rather than necessary expenses; the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA do not require otherwise, and Form 433-A confers no rights on taxpayers. On: Partial payment agreements

Liens and levies

CaseDrye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999)

A state-law disclaimer of an inheritance does not defeat the federal tax lien; state law defines the taxpayer's rights, but federal law decides whether those rights are property or rights to property under IRC 6321. On: Federal tax liens

CaseUnited States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002)

A taxpayer's interest in tenancy-by-the-entirety property is property to which the federal tax lien attaches despite the state-law fiction that neither spouse has a separate interest; the IRS's administrative position (Notice 2003-60, IRM 5.17.2.5.2.4) values the interest at one-half and decides foreclosure case by case. On: Federal tax liens

CaseUnited States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713 (1985)

The IRS may levy on a joint account the taxpayer has an unrestricted state-law right to withdraw from; a bank served with a levy has only two defenses (no property of the taxpayer, or prior judicial attachment), and competing ownership claims are resolved after the levy because an administrative levy is a provisional remedy. On: Levies and wage garnishment

CaseUnited States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983)

IRC 7403 lets a district court order the sale of the entire property, including a non-liable spouse's homestead interest, with that spouse compensated from the proceeds, subject to limited equitable discretion; administrative levy under IRC 6331 reaches only the taxpayer's interest. On: Levies and wage garnishment

CaseEC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 550 U.S. 429 (2007)

IRC 7426(a)(1) is the exclusive remedy for a third party whose property is levied to pay another's tax; a refund suit under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1) cannot be used to evade its short limitations period (nine months then; two years under IRC 6532(c)(1) for levies after December 22, 2017). On: Levies and wage garnishment

CaseUnited States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114 (2004)

A timely assessment of employment tax against a partnership suffices to extend the collection period against the general partners who are liable for the partnership's debts; no separate assessment against the partners is required because it is the tax that is assessed, not the taxpayer. On: Collection statute (CSED)

Trust fund recovery penalty

CaseBrounstein v. United States, cited in IRM 5.7.3

A non-owner officer with significant control over which creditors are paid cannot avoid TFRP responsibility by showing an owner told them not to pay the taxes; the IRM cites it for the point that such employees may have to resign rather than follow the order. On: Trust fund recovery penalty

CaseSlodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978)

A person who becomes responsible after withheld taxes were dissipated does not violate IRC 6672 by using later-acquired, untraceable funds for other purposes, because neither IRC 6672 nor 7501 impresses a trust on after-acquired funds; but the successor must pay over trust funds on hand when control is assumed. On: Trust fund recovery penalty

Innocent spouse relief

CasePorter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203 (2009); see also 130 T.C. 115 (2008)

The Tax Court applies a de novo standard of review to IRC 6015(f) determinations, and had held it could consider trial evidence outside the administrative record; IRC 6015(e)(7), added in 2019, now provides de novo review on the administrative record plus newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, superseding the scope holding. On: Innocent spouse relief

CaseLantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), rev'g 132 T.C. 131 (2009)

The Seventh Circuit upheld the two-year deadline in Treas. Reg. 1.6015-5(b)(1) for IRC 6015(f) requests; the IRS abandoned the deadline in Notice 2011-70 and IRC 6015(f)(2) (2019) now allows a request while the IRC 6502 or 6511 period is open, so the case is history even though the regulation text has not been amended. On: Innocent spouse relief

Bankruptcy

CaseYoung v. United States, 535 U.S. 43 (2002)

The three-year lookback period of 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(8)(A)(i) is tolled during a prior bankruptcy regardless of the debtor's good faith; Congress codified the rule in 2005 in the paragraph at the end of 507(a)(8), adding 90 days. On: Bankruptcy and tax debts

CaseUnited States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990)

A bankruptcy court may order the IRS to apply a Chapter 11 debtor's tax payments to trust fund taxes first where it finds the designation necessary to the success of the reorganization; IRC 6672 remains available against responsible persons. On: Bankruptcy and tax debts

CaseMallo v. IRS, 774 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2014)

Because applicable filing requirements include filing deadlines, the 11 U.S.C. 523(a) hanging paragraph excludes late-filed Forms 1040 from the definition of a return, so the tax is never dischargeable; the IRS does not take this position and instead argues that a debt assessed before the return is filed is one for which no return was filed (Chief Counsel Notice CC-2010-016). In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015), agrees. On: Bankruptcy and tax debts

CaseIn re Colsen, 446 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2006)

Under the Beard test, whether a document is a return is judged from the face of the form, not the filer's delinquency, so Forms 1040 filed after the IRS assessed were returns and the tax was dischargeable (pre-2005 law); the other side of the circuit split. On: Bankruptcy and tax debts

Passport certification

CaseRuesch v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 289 (2020), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 25 F.4th 67 (2d Cir. 2022)

Tax Court jurisdiction under IRC 7345(e) is limited to whether the certification was erroneous or the IRS failed to reverse it; the underlying liability cannot be litigated in a passport case, and the claim is moot once the IRS reverses the certification. On: Passport certification

CaseRowen v. Commissioner, 156 T.C. 101 (2021)

IRC 7345 merely provides for the certification of tax-related facts and does not itself restrict international travel, so it does not violate the Fifth Amendment; the scope and standard of review were left open. On: Passport certification

CaseAdams v. Commissioner, 160 T.C. No. 1 (2023)

The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction in a passport case to review the underlying liabilities or the State Department's actions; IRC 7345(b)(1)(A) requires only that the liability has been assessed, not properly assessed. On: Passport certification

Transferee liability

CaseAtlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 86 (1978)

De facto merger and mere continuation doctrines as a basis for transferee liability at law under IRC 6901; a statutory merger where the survivor is primarily liable is not a transferee case. On: Transferee liability (IRC 6901)

CaseGumm v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 475 (1989)

Before pursuing a transferee in equity, the IRS must generally exhaust its remedies against the transferor or show they would be futile; it need not pursue a corporation stripped of its assets. On: Transferee liability (IRC 6901)

CaseBresson v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 172 (1998)

State fraudulent transfer limitation periods do not apply to the federal transferee assessment; the IRC 6901(c) periods control. On: Transferee liability (IRC 6901)

S corporation compensation

CaseDavid E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 668 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2012)

Distributions to a CPA shareholder-employee were recharacterized as wages subject to employment tax where the salary paid was unreasonably low; one of the decisions the IRS lists as authority for recharacterization. On: S corp reasonable compensation

CaseJoly v. Commissioner; Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Commissioner; Joseph M. Grey Public Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-361, aff'd 211 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 2000); 117 T.C. 141 (2001); 119 T.C. 121 (2002)

The Tax Court decisions the IRS cites alongside Rev. Rul. 74-44 for treating payments to a working shareholder as wages rather than distributions. On: S corp reasonable compensation

How decisions are used on this site

TaxProc is a procedure reference, not a case reporter. A decision appears here because it changes what a practitioner does: whether a late petition can be saved, whether Appeals can take new evidence, whether a preparer’s fraud keeps a year open, whether a computer-generated penalty needs a supervisor’s signature. Citations are to the official reporters where the opinion has been published and to the docket number where it has not. Check the subsequent history before citing any of them in a protest or petition; this page is updated when a cited decision is reversed, affirmed or superseded.